Events by Brown, Randolph Gordon
Randolph Gordon Brown
Master of Philosophy 
Bedford College, London 
1976 ,
ProQuest Number: 10097337
All rights reserved
INFORMATION TO ALL USERS 
The quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the copy submitted.
In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript 
and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed,
a note will indicate the deletion.
uest.
ProQuest 10097337
Published by ProQuest LLC(2016). Copyright of the Dissertation is held by the Author.
All rights reserved.
This work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
Microform Edition © ProQuest LLC.
ProQuest LLC 
789 East Eisenhower Parkway 
P.O. Box 1346 
Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346
Abstract
That the theory of events has not recently 
contributed significantly to the problem cf supervenience 
Is due mainly to the literature being devoid of a genuine 
t>er:rv of events. Kim's theory is not accompanied by a 
method for its application independent of the expressions 
used to refer to events, and Davidson establishes events 
as spatio-temporal particulars without a theory about 
their nature.
The analysis of events is approached here in the 
context of the elucidation of supervenience. Conditions 
of adequacy reflecting prior metaphysical assumptions and 
the intended scope cf the analysis are initially laid down, 
and after consideration of the work of Kim and Davidson, 
some suggestions of Cresswell are taken up, and while 
criticized, provide nevertheless the basic impetus for 
the analysis presented. This theorj’ constructionally 
defines events as functions from possible worlds to regions 
of space-time*, in which the event is manifested in the 
various worlds. Incorporated in this account is a theory 
of how events may coincide in value at certain worlds, and 
how a * partitioning process' -accompanies individual events, 
by virtue of which the manifestation is considered as an 
element or elements in a particular place in the causal 
history of the world in cuestion. Different sorts of 
partitioning nrocesses, and comolex causal histories 
serve to allow the possibility of emergent ism, notv/ith- 
standing the same-place-same-thing principle being taken 
as a condition of adequacy. An analysis of statements 
ascribing properties to events completes the account, 
which is then tested against the established adequacy 
conditions. It is shcun to satisfy these, Èlong with 
ascribing the aprrcnri^te truth-value to the various 
examples of purported event-identity considered in the 
peoer.
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Tn order for us to make sense of a significant 
portion of ordinary discourse, it would seem sufficient 
for us to adopt an ontology of events* It is not at all 
clear from that discourse, however, just what sort of 
entity it is that needs to be recognised, and this is all 
the more true if we add to the explanandum modal state­
ments about the ‘properties events might have had, or the 
ones that they could not but have.
The aim of this paper is to provide an 
ontological analysis of events that is sufficient for 
the interpretation of event-dlscourse, including the sorts 
of modal statements mentioned above. To be more precise, 
conditions of adequacy for the analysis may be formulated, 
against which it may be tested. These conditions fall 
into two groups; the first reflect some prior, more basic 
metaphysical Ide'-as with which the analysij must be in 
accord, and the second determine the scope the analysis 
is expected to have. i
In the first group there are four; taking " Px ” 
to mean ” x is a. spatio-temporal particular ", " Qxyz * to 
mean " x took place in place y at time z ", and " Rxy " 
to mean x caused y "; with *u*, *v*, and *x' rang­
ing over particulars, *p* over places and *t* over times, 
the conditions may be expressed as follows:
(Cl) (u)( ?u^(9r)(i3t)( Qupt )) • ,
(C2) (u)(v)( Huv —> ( Pu & Pv ))
(C3) (u)(v)(p)(t)(( Pu & Pv ) ^ (  u = v4^( Qupt,;ê^Qvpt ))). ’ 
(04) (u)(v)( u = v^(w)(x)(( Ru w O rvw ) & ( Rxu^r^Rxv )))
A few points may be mentioned. The forward 
implications of the principle bi-conditionals of (03) 
and (C4) are clearly instances of the fundamental principle 
of extensionality that for " a = b " to be true, a and b 
must have exactly the same properties; (C3) contains a 
good portion of Kim's- criterion for event-identity, and 
(04) is identical to Davidson's, the latter taking events, 
as does Kim, as spatio-temporal particulars/ The adop­
tion of both these conditions requires that some 
discussion and judgement is presented on the various 
points at issue between the two authors, and this is 
provided below in II. From that discussion there will 
arise certain paradigmatic particular cases of sentences 
asserting identity between events, for which the analysis 
must, in accordance with the above conditions, assign a 
particular truth-value.
(02) is acceptable to both Kim and Davidson, arid 
does not seem to offend Intuition. Largely for these 
reasons, the inclusion of (02) will not be defended here, 
but it may be pointed out that it does not carry with it 
any implication that a spatio-temporàl particular is, by 
virtue of being spatio-temporal, a material entity. In 
considering the location of particulars in space-time, it 
is unnecessary and probably undesirable to be over demand­
ing about the precise boundaries of particulars, and if 
exactness is abandoned in this sphere there is nothing to
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stop us calling an idea in someone's mind a spatio- - 
temporal particular. The location of the idea is 
just the same as the person's, or perhaps in his head.
Clearly there is no need to adopt here e stand on the
mind-hrain identity thesis.
The second group of conditions may he presented 
by citing certain statement-fonns; for each particular 
instance of these the analysis is required to provide an 
account of the determination of truth-value. The forms 
are ;
(?1) Event e has property P;
(P2) Event e has property P, but it could have been not-P;
(E3) Event e could not but have been P;
(P4) Event e = event f.
Particular examples of these will be considered as 
required in the body of the paper.
One basic assumption may be stated explicitly.'
It is derived from some ( unpublished ) remarks of 
Kaplan, and amounts to treating space-time as a necessary 
existent, and furthermore treating some of its geometri­
cal properties as its necessary properties. This is 
interpreted as Implying that any possible world that is 
considered is taken to have the same space-tirae as the 
real world, and the same basic geometrical structure. 
Clearly, the idea is a development of the_Kantian 
attitude towards space and time.
V'TrTl-
— 6 —
A word of justification is in order here for the 
method of analysis to he employed in the paper.
Conditions of adequacy have been laid down that will -= 
constitute the principle test of the analysis that is to 
follow. This analysis will consist of •constructional 
definitions* of events, and certain other entities needed 
for the treatment of event-discourse, end then interpre- 
tations will be provided, in the light of these definit­
ions, of the statement-forms (PI) - (P4). This theory 
may then be tested against (Cl) - (C3), and any particu­
lar consequences that have been shown to follow from them.
It may be objected that the definition of events
to be proposed later is contrary to all our ordinary
conceptions of just what events are; and this fact
alone may be considered sufficient to discard the theory
altogether. My defence of the rajethod will be limited to
a more or less innocent use of the argument from
authority. It may be argued that innocence in the use
of such arguments ié inversely related tq_the status of
the authority cited*, and so here the use is far from
innocent! ’ Be that as it may, the objection being
considered would be profitably referred to the first
chapter of Felson Goodman's 'The Structure of Appearance',
in which he devotes considerable space to the rigorous 
exfenr/o r\a(
formulation of^necessary and sufficient conditions which 
constructional definitions need to satisfy in order for 
them to be considered accurate.
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He considers this problem in relation to Whitehead's 
proposal to identify points with certain classes of 
volumes. It misses the point to criticize Whitehead 
"because we are not talking about certain classes of 
volumes when we speak of points. What needs to be 
done is to reinterpret the sentences to be explained 
in the light of the definitions laid down. Before 
Goodman reaches the more technical discussion of 
conditions on constructional definitions, he states 
the requirement as amounting, roughly, to " Every 
sentence we care about that can be translated into the 
system shall have the same truth-value as its translat­
ion. " The problem with this, of course, is the 
determination of which sentences will be deemed to be 
of concern, as he has shovm there exist sentences which 
must be excluded in order to avoid paradox, and the more 
formal presentation of the condition he suggests should 
be stated:
* The necessary and sufficient condition for the 
accuracy of constructional definition seems to be that 
the definiens be extensionally isomorphic.to the 
definiendum. More generally, the set of all the 
definientia of a system must be extensionally iso&orphic 
to the set of all the definienda.
A constructional definition is not, ihen, attempting to 
formalize our usual conceptions. A theory successfully 
constructed on such definitions is of intrinsic value in 
that it demonstrates an alternative way the true state­
ments in some particular area may be analysed, with the 
additional advantage of perspicuity in logical structure
— 8 —
i The second authority I shell mention is Prege.
Tn the preface to 'The Foundations of ^ethemctlee', 
the following passage occurs very near to__the end:
* To those who feel Inclined to criticize my •
definitions as unnatural, I would suggest-that the point 
here is not whether they are natural but whether they go 
to the root of the matter and are logically beyond critic­
ism. » ^  "
The definitions to be suggested below are almost certain­
ly unnatural in some sense or other. But if they go to 
the root of the matter and are logically beyond criticism 
- or, in Tarski's terms, satisfy the condition of material 
adequacy and are formally correct - they will have served 
their purpose.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *  —
There is a more basic, strategic, philosophical 
inquiry motivating the analysis of events, and it is 
hoped the latter will provide some illumination of the 
former. A precise characterisation of the issue is not 
easy to provide, and ingredients of the problem are 
present in various ideas and disputes in the history of 
philosophy. Some of these may be cited. Firstly, there 
is the idea, stemming from Hegel, that quantitative 
changes within a certain thing result, at certain nodal 
points, in qualitative changes in the thing. A common 
example of this transformation of Quantity into quality, 
which with its reverse, is sometimes called the second 
law of dialectics, is the form of the progression of
HgO through changes in temperature, which is taken as the
o
quantitative change. The changes in form at 0 C. and 
100*0., from solid to liquid, and liquid to gas, are
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taken as the qualitative transformations. A more 
exciting example is provided by Kapoleon, no less, who 
speaks of fights between the French cavalry, who were 
bad riders but disciplined, and the Mamelukes, who were 
the best horsemen of their time but lacked discipline:
• Two Mamelukes were undoubtedly more than a match 
for three Frenchmen; 100 Mamelukes were .equal to 100 
Frenchmen; 300 Frenchmen could generally beat 300 
Mamelukes, and 1,000 Frenchmen invariably defeated 1,500 
Mamelukes. * ^
Secondly, modern physics has taken such an 
extraordinary course of development that certain 
scientists have been encouraged to philosophize about 
the discoveries of science in ways that have offended 
some 'professional* philosophers. In particular the 
dispute between Susan Stebbing and Bddington will be 
recalled.^ Eddington, in talking of his two tables and 
so on, undoubtedly was misleading, and Stebbing was 
correct to point out the criteria we commonly associate 
with properties like continuity and solidity when we say 
of something that they have these properties. However, 
there does seem to be some space between criteria for 
application and meaning, and it can barely be denied 
that modern physics raises a problem for our everyday 
conception of the world, and while Bddington failed to 
describe this problem soberly or accurately, it does not 
seem to be easily solved by an appeal to our ordinary 
usage of words.
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Closely related to this are certain problems 
involved in the relation between the battle of Waterloo, 
and that certain movement of elementary physical partic­
les at the time and place of the battle. This problem,
which is mentioned by Cresswell, will be treated
?
extensively below. One central element ^ o the problem 
is that of the possibility of reducing the battle to the 
particles, as a specific example of the reduction of 
branches of science to more basic, or fundamental 
branches. The issues will i^ fact be approached from 
the idea contrary to reductionism, known commonly as 
emergentism, or emergent evolutionism, or supervenience.
The basic idea is that developing physical systems some­
times reach points of a certain complexity at which they 
acquire properties of an essentially new and different 
kind. Thus complex matter at a point of development 
becomes life, and life at a certain higher level attains 
consciousness. At the nodal points, the new properties 
emerge, or supervene, on the system.
It should be stressed that no attempt is being 
made to show the essential equivalence of the ideas cited 
from dialectics^, Eddington, and emergentism; they do seem, 
however, to be closely related. The intention here is 
not to provide an emergentist theory of events, but 
rather one that is neutral as regards this question.
The analysis should provide room for emergentism, then, 
and equally room for its denial. This purpose is served
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by giving a framework in which a notion basic to all 
the positions discussed can be expressed; the notion 
is that of 'levels of integration', as they are some­
times called, expressing the idea that reality can be 
studied at different levels, expressed in the hierarchy 
of sciences, from physics through chemistry and biology 
to psychology and sociology. The disputes mentioned 
above, roughly, are about the relations between these 
different levels, and such disputes in themselves are 
outside the scope of the analysis of events, though it 
may be hoped, as has been said, that the analysis will 
throw some light on those disputes.
II
Neither Fim nor Davidson is much concerned with 
(72) or (73), and it is from the requirements of these 
forms that the analysis presented here will spting. 
Consideration of them may be delayed, however, and (74) 
may initially be considered without any reference to 
modalities. In a recent paper on events, Kira seems to 
take as a major purpose of his account a defence of a 
version of the regularity theory of causation. %ile 
the motivation for the analysis should not be forgotten, 
the theory should, from our point of view, be tested as a 
theory of events, with conditions of adequacy already 
laid down, rather than from the point of view of how well 
it fits a certain account of causation.
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According to Kim, events have a common struc­
ture, and constitute the exemplification by a concrete 
object ( or objects ) of a property or relation at a time. 
Events may be represented by expressions of the form
 P / ^ 3
where ......... ) is an ordered n-tuple of concrete
r\ *+/objects, the constitutive objects of the event; p  
is the n-adic property exemplified by the ordered set of 
objects - the constitutive property of the event; and 
t is the time of the event. A certain amount of 
complexity is required for the precise formulation of 
identity conditions, but basically the idea is clear: 
events are identical if constitutive objects, properties 
and times are identical. His picture of events is 
clarified when he says:
* Every event has a unique constitutive property, 
namely the property an exemplification of which by an 
object at a time is that event ... these constitutive 
properties of events are generic events. It follows 
that each event falls toder exactly one generic event.
The constant conjunction element in a causal relation
between two particular events is then analysed in terras
of the constant conjunction of the generic events that
the particular events exemplify.
It is important, Kim says
* to notice the distinction drawn by our analysis 
between properties constitutive of events, and properties 
exemplified by theml An example should make this clear: 
tke property of dying is a constitutive property of the 
event [(Socrates, t ), dying], i.e., Socrates* dying at 
t, but not a property exemplified by it; the property of 
occurring in a prison is a property this event exemplifies, 
but is not constitutive of it. • **
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Properties an event exemplifies are easy enough - they are 
properties true of the event. The constitutive property 
holds between the constitutive objects, and furthermore 
only ’pure universels’, he says, are allowed to play the 
role of constitutive property. However, not only does 
Fim leave the notion of ’pure universal* unexamined, he 
does not provide us with any method of determining just 
what the constitutive objects of an event are.
We need to remember here Davidson’s good advice
that a clear distinction must be made between events and
—  iz,
the terms we use to describe them. Kim sells us the idea 
of constitutive properties the more easily by talking about 
Socrates’ death and pointing to the property ’ dying ’.
But all are agreed that events are spatio-temporal 
particulars, and from this it follows that just what 
constitutive property an event has is independent of how 
we refer to the event, and so it is inadequate to treat 
solely of events that under most normal circumstances 
are referred to by a single description that itself lends 
credence to the idea there is some unique constitutive 
property of the event to which it refers. Yet Kim 
always speaks of individual events with expressions that 
display the event’s structure, as conceived by Kim; the 
event wears its structure, as it were, on the face of the 
expression that Kim uses to refer to it. But no method 
is provided, of course, for deciding just which express­
ion displays the event’s actual structure.
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It is possible that one confusion present here 
is between the necessary properties of an event, and the 
constitutive property of an event. At the level of a 
simple example, it may seem that there is a direct rela­
tion between the constitutive property and a certain 
necessary one. Thus it seems reasonable to think that, 
corresponding to the constitutive property of Socrates* 
death, namely ’dying*, there is the necessary property 
of the event, ’ is a dying ’. If we imagine a far more 
complex event, though, it is unlikely that it would be 
correct to say that for this event to occur in any 
possible world, it must display exactly this highly- 
complex relation; might there not be, possibly, just a 
little variation at the 48th place of the predicate?
There will, clearly, be some relation the other way 
round, from necessary properties to the constitutive one, 
but it is not clear that it can be described generally in 
any particularly simple way.
By way of more direct criticism, there is at hand 
a powerful counterexample to Kira’s theory, which shows 
that it contradicts (03) and (C4). Rosenberg has point­
ed out that [(Oedipus, Oedipus’ mother) married, t,] and 
[/Oedipus, Oedipus’ mother) marryingy %  incestuously^é J 
ere identical, having the same locations, constitutive 
objects, causes and effects? And yet, on Kim’s account, 
they are distinct, displaying as they do different 
constitutive properties. And so, distinct particulars 
share the same location, causes and effects, according to 
the analysis, which therefore immediately becomes, 
inadequate for our purposes, and needs to be modified. 
Rosenberg himself proposes Amendments so that events
- 15 -
turn out identical if their constitutive objecta are,
if their times are, and if their respective objects all
share the same constitutive properties, of which there
it
can be more than one. Now he notes that^is clear that 
whether or not events are identical is not something that 
can be read off from their descriptions, as indeed has 
been implied here, following from Davidson’s good advice. 
Rosenberg saye descriptions may cite different constitu­
tive properties, but it seems that descriptions 
alternatively might not cite any such properties at all. 
Socrates’ death might be perfectly well picked out by the 
description ’ the event you described to me last week ’. 
This aside, Rosenlberg argues that when it comes down to 
actually determining event-identity, we have to resort 
to Davidson’s criterion: events are identical if and 
only if their causes and effects are identical. It seems 
then we are still left with no method for determining the 
structure of any given event, for we might know its causes 
and effects without knowing just what constant conjunc­
tion or conjunctions of properties this particular case 
instantiates. It cannot be denied that the suitability 
of Kira’s account of event-structure for the explication 
of the constant conjunction element in causation is 
definitely something in its favour, but without a guide to 
the determination of structure in the particular case it 
remains inadequate.
— 16 —
It
Perhaps it may be argued thatj^ is obvious in any, 
or at least, most, particular cases, just what the 
constitutive objects are; where it is obvious e method 
for determining structure might be described as follows; 
take all possible combinations of the constitutive 
objects, and list for each combination the pure universal 
or universale they exemplify. My objection to this 
raises again the philosophical problem motivating this 
inquiry, for I think it is not possible to take the first 
step - to determine objectively end unambiguously, the 
unique constitutive objects of an event, conceived as a 
spatio-temporal particular* Is it neutrons and elec­
trons on that day in 1815, or men that are constituents?
To take enot&er example, consider the event • the first 
performance of Tulu in Chicago •• Are the constituent 
objects of this all the people involved in the production, 
the theatre where it was staged, and so on, or alternative­
ly, the work of art, and the theatre where it is performed?
As vdll become clearer later, it is in the 
context where a method exists for determining the ordered 
series of objects constitutive of an event that Kim’s 
analysis can be introduced, after some modifications. 
Nevertheless, his basic claim that all events can be 
reduced according to his schema will still be Questioned, 
some events being treated as basic particulars, not open 
to reductive analysis of this sort. Kim mentions the
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problem of the relation of whole to parts and says that 
he expects the problem depends for its solution on a 
satisfactory general account of properties. I 
suspect rather that the problem is best approached not 
so much from the point of view of properties, as from 
the relations between the objects which hold properties. 
The problem of whole and parts is closely related with 
the strategic problem under consideration here; the 
battle of Waterloo has properties of a sort not seem­
ingly explainable in terms of its parts, conceived as 
elementary physical particles; perhaps, then, new 
properties have emerged at the level of the whole.
Now properties that elementary particles have and 
properties that battles have, and what generally hav­
ing properties boils down to, is not the most pressing 
aspect of the problem here; rather our first problem is 
with the relation of the object, the battle, to the 
objects, the constitutive particles.
These issues will be expanded when an analysis 
of events is presented below, but there is a difficulty 
to be considered that Kim mentions, for any analysis of 
causation which involves constant conjunction and that 
does not treat events as he does with unioue 
constitutive properties. It has been said that the 
conditions of adequacy in operation here are independ­
ent of the motivation behind Kim's account, but neverthe­
less causation is one of the most important problems that
— X8 —
a theory of events should he able to play a part in, 
and an argument of the sort Kim presents should at 
least be mentioned, particularly as I assume constant 
conjunction is likely to play a central role in any 
adequate theory of causation.
Kim considers a theory which does not analyse
the structure of events, and treats, in his terms, only
IS
of properties exemplified by events; a problem arises 
if the following, seemingly inoccuous proposal is made 
as regards the satisfaction of the constant conjunction 
requirement in a regularity theory of causationi two 
events, e and e* satisfy the requirement if there are 
generic events P and G such that e is an P-event, e* is 
a G-event, and P-events are constantly conjoined with G- 
events.
Kira interprets a picture of this sort as allow­
ing considerable freedom in the choice of generic events 
to which the events may be said to belong, and shows that 
if any grouping of events is allowed as a generic event - 
or if any property exemplifisble by events is taken as 
one - then the requirement so Interpreted becomes quite 
useless. He does this by showing that every event 
satisfies the requirement with respect to any event 
that satisfies the requirement with respect to at least 
one event. Taking the schema above, let e" be any 
arbitrary event and R be any relation such that R(e",e). 
We explain to be true of any event g just in case
— 19 —
( 3f)( R(g,f) & 7(f) ). Then clearly e" belongs to 
the generic event H, and H-events are constantly 
conjoined with G-evente, from which it follows that 
e" and e* satisfy the requirement of constant 
conjunction.
It seems to me to be clear from this that any 
satisfactory account of causation must demarcate among 
properties those that might be able to fill the role of 
being a • genuine * constant conjunct for a theory of 
causation, and this is no minor problem. It is, after 
all, a disguised version of Goodman's new problem of 
induction. It is not a problem, though, for which 
there is no analagous difficulty for Kim, for it will 
be recalled that Kim said nothing much about • pure 
universale ', and without demarcating these off, it 
is possible to construct some very objectionable events, 
according to his schema. It is certainly the case that 
H is not a pure universal, if the expression is to be 
given any reasonable meaning, for a large number of 
possible interpretations for R. While, then, Kim's 
point is taken that there are pitfalls for crude or 
oversimplified approaches to the constant conjunction 
requirement, this does not seem to compel us to adopt 
his approach, or any one like it.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
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The motivation for Davidson's interest in 
events is different from Kim's - though causation 
does play a central role for him as well - and there 
is not in Davidson's work an analysis of events 
that genuinely rivals Kira's. His concern is to 
establish events ontologically, in order to provide 
an account of some ordinary discourse. He does, 
however, offer a criterion for event-individuation 
different from Kim's, and also disputes with him over 
the truth-value of certain particular cases of 
supposed event-identity.
It would be too strong to claim that it is a
necessary condition of our understanding a certain
part of ordinary discourse that we adopt an ontology
of events. Other methods are available, which are
probably equally as adequate. Davidson may argue
however, that he offers an account that comes near to
being sufficient for the solution of the problems
16
associated with that discourse. He asks us to 
note that, in virtue of its logical form, " Sebastian 
strolled through the streets of Bologna at 2 a.m. " 
entails " Sebastian strolled through the streets of 
Bologna ", but our usual wayjjformalizing these 
sentences does not display this relation at all. A 
language in standard formalization would take the 
first sentence to contain an irreducible three-place 
predicate, and the second an unrelated two-place 
predicate.
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Davidson's solution consists in providing 
verbs of action or change with an extra, * event ' - 
place, thereby assuming them to take an cvent-ohject.
Thus " Sebastian strolled ’ is construed a.s " There 
is an X such that x is a stroll and Sebastian took 
X " or, as Davidson prefers, ’ There is an x such 
that Sebastian strolled X Taking another example
from a different paper, we have the problem that 
" Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back in the forum with 
a knife " entails " Brutus stabbed Caesar in the back 
in the forum ", which in turn entails " Brutus stabbed 
Caesar in the back ", itself entailing " Brutus stabbed 
Caesar Davidson writes
' •,. our theory of language has gone badly astray 
if we must treat each adverbial modification as introduc­
ing a new place into a predicate.,.once we have events to 
talk about, we can say as much or as little as we please 
about them. Thus the troublesome sentence becomes;;;
" There exists an event that is a srtabbing of Caesar by 
Brutus event, it is an into the back of Caesar event, it 
took place in the forum, and Brutus did it with a knife. " 
The wanted entailments now go through as a matter of form. *
Davidson says that this treats adverbial 
modification then, on a par logically with adjectival 
modification”; adverbial clauses modifying the events 
certain verbs introduce. But there are other possible 
treatments of adverbs other than his and the one he 
attacks in the passage. Without going into details, 
it should be mentioned that the problem of adverbs ie 
being approached from a different direction with some 
success. Into a basic calculus we may introduce a 
predicate modifier, construed as
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a function that maps an extension of one predicate
onto a new extension. 'Slowly*, for example, is
interpreted by a function which, when attached to
the predicate *x drives*, yields a new predicate,
*x drives slowly*, whose extension is the set of all 
te
slow drivers. Clearly the account will need to be
extended to cope with adverbs that do not modify a
predicate by picking out a set contained within the
original extension. Things that satisfy *x drives
slowly* are clearly among those things that satisfy
*x drives*, but it will prove to be more tricky to
characterize the value of the function associated
with 'nearly*, for example. However, Davidson
faces analagous problems with adverbs of this soft
with his approach, as indeed, it seems any theory of
adverbs will.
Thus it should be stressed that ordinary
discourse does not compel us to adopt an ontology of
events along the lines Davidson suggests, as there are
other alternatives no worse than Davidson's.
Nevertheless there is strong intuitive support for
the idea that there are events. Some of this support
springs from the vital role events play in certain
philosophical theories - of action, explanation,
/9causality and the mind-brain relation. To take just 
one example, both Kim and Davidson think that cause 
is a relation that holds between events. It has been
~ 23 -
given here the status of a condition of adeouacy 
that causes and effects be spatio-temporal particulars, 
and T think that it is a central feature of our under­
standing of causation that events may be causes end 
effects. Furthermore, the importance of causation 
in modern philosophy of language and epistemology 
adds further weight to the argument that we should 
recognize events as entities.
There are arguments to hand, though, that 
try to show the event theory of causation has import­
ant limitations. Certain examples do not at all 
well fit Davidson's picture of " x caused y ” as 
an extensions! context in which x and y are properly
supplanted with expressions referring to events.
ao
Russell Trenholme has noticed that while it is 
reasonable to agree that 'John's walking' and 'John's 
walking slowly' are associated with the same event, 
it might he true that " Stubbing his toe caused 
John to walk slowly ", but false that " Stubbing his 
toe caused John to walk Goldman raises an
X/
associated difficulty; Davidson would presumably 
want to regard these simultaneous actions as identical: 
John's singing, John's singing loudly, and John's sing­
ing off key. Now, he argues, it could be the case 
that his being angry partlelly causes hie singing 
loudly, but it does not cause his singing off key.
Ro there is a difficulty here like Trenholme's, of 
the breakdown of the intersubstitution of identicals
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salva veritate. But a different conclusion may be 
drawn, if we remember Davidson's criterion for event- 
identity - that they are identical if they have the 
same causes and effects. Standing by this, the 
arguments seem to support the conclusion that John's 
walking and John's walking slowly are distinct, as, 
by the same reasoning, are ♦ John's singing loudly and 
bis singing off-key.
Davidson, of course, is aware of difficulties 
of this sort. He cites certain statements himself 
that go against the account he gives, a good example 
being " The slowness with which controls were applied 
caused the rapidity with which inflation developed. " 
His tentative suggestion is that these statements are 
rudimentary explanations, and explanations typically 
relate statements. Therefore, 'caused' in cases such 
as this is better read 'causally explains'.
There is definitely, I think, something to 
this, but the temptation to resort to a paraphrasing 
in terms of the more vague 'causally explains' is to 
be avoided, as I think to do this, rather than to 
confront more directly these opposing arguments, is 
liable to lead to the abandoning of causation as an 
objective relation holding between events altogether. 
This danger is even clearer when it is realized the 
transition from a statement about e causal relation 
between two events to a statement of causal 
explanation is in many cases a completely effortless 
step, the former often being used precisely to give 
8 causal explanation.
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îTaturally our purpose is served by rejecting 
the arguments of Trenholme and&oldman, es they under­
mine our conditions of adequacy; yet one would he 
hard pressed to deny their assertions that what the 
Davidsonian takes to he an intersubstitution of 
identicals leads to a breakdown of the salva verltate 
principle, in so far as we appeal for guidance concern­
ing truth-values to our natural intuitions. Defend­
ing, as I wish to, the Davidsonian identity claims, 
it is necessary to deny the breakdown of the principle; 
and this involves the assertion that we have a better 
theory of the nature of causation than the one implicit 
in our intuitive denial of the statements ” Stubbing 
his toe caused John to walk ” and John’s being angry 
caused John’s singing off key Although these state­
ments might be misleading, and unable to play a clear 
explanatory role, these statements are nevertheless 
true. The apparent strength of the arguments presented 
by Trenholme and Goldman is based largely on our being 
infected with the confused and wrong idea that we can 
read off from a singular causal statement what constant 
conjunction of properties is beingi in this particular 
instance, instantiated. We know that the truth of 
’• the striking of the match caused the lighting of the 
match ” does not imply that strikings and lightings are 
constantly conjoined, any more than ” John’s last 
action caused what made Susie jump ” implies last
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actions of John are always followed by jumps of Susie.
Ho more is required of the expressions used to pick out 
the cause and effect than that they do so adeouately pick 
them out. Causation is a relation holding between 
events independently of the choice-of referring 
expressions in asserting the relation to hold in any 
particular case. Consequently the truth of such a 
singular causal statement must be saved through the 
transformations according to the principles of 
extensionality.
It may well seem that in providing the 
adverbial modification to the effect in ” John’s 
stubbing his toe caused John to walk slowly " we are 
indicating the causally relevant feature of the effect. 
Once the objectivity of the causal relation, and with 
it the extensionality of the context ’x caused y’, 
have been grasped, there is nothing to stop language 
users introducing conventions about the use of adverbs 
in the context of singular causal statements. Some­
thing of this gort, in fact, no doubt exists, though 
not as anything explicitly formulated. If it is said 
” John’s being angry caused Jolin’s singing loudly ", 
there is at least the suggestion that the loudness of 
his singing is causally related to his anger.
Certainly there are other factors aiding us to pick 
up this suggestion - most importantly, the expectation 
from past experience of the constant conjunction of 
anger and loud singing, that it is the anger and
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loudness causally related - but the unwritten 
convention is, I suspect, there as well. Its presence 
is not to be questioned, but eoually it should be 
recognised for the sake of the theory of causation.
I take the requirements of an adequate theory 
of causation to be a very good reason for adopting an 
ontology of events. Further, as is clear from our 
conditions of adequacy, I think a good theory will 
incorporate Davidson’s criterion for event-identity.
The main shortcoming in his work, for our purposes, is 
the lack of a theory of events; they are treated as 
basic particulars, with no direct handling of the 
problem of their constitution. This aside, there 
are also some very questionable positions Davidson 
adopts when certain concrete examples of statements 
asserting event-identity are considered. Goldman 
has argued against certain Davidsonian identity claims, 
and his attacks will be criticized, but in controversy 
with Fim, it seems the evidence goes against Davidson.
The first of Goldman’s arguments to be 
considered here is centred on statements essentially 
using the preposition ’by’:
’ We say ... that John turns on the light ’by’ 
flipping the switch, or that he checkmates his opnonent 
’by’ moving his queen to king-knight-seven. As used 
in these contexts, the" term ’by’ expresses a relation­
ship that holds between acts, between John’s act of 
flipping the switch and hie act of turning on the light, 
and between John’s act of moving his queen to king- 
knight-seven and his act of checkmating his opponent.
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The relationship in question might he expressed hy 
saying that the one act is a ’way* or ’method’ by which 
the other act is performed. Typically, when act A is 
the way by which act A’ is performed, we can explain how 
act A* has been performed by citing act
^is point is, of course, that this relationship is
asymmetric and irreflexive, and so any A and A’ that
satisfy it cannot be identical. The cases he quotes,
however, are examples of cases where Davidson would
ascribe identity;
I do not want to adopt any position on David­
son’s thesis, almost universally accepted, that actions 
are a kind of event. It is not at all obvious, it seems, 
that this is true, and that they share the same criterion 
of identity. Supposing they are, though, I think 
Goldman’s argument is less powerful than it at first 
appears to be. Fotice first that the form of the 
statements we are considering does not suggest that ’by* 
is a relation holding between two acts; the sentence 
" John turns on the light by flipping the switch " 
would at this surface level be analysed more accurately 
as a relation between a statement and an act. More 
precisely, perhaps, the form is • He performed this 
act by performing that one **. It seems that the 
form of the second half of this statement is still un­
clear, but following Goldman’s remarks at the end of 
the quote we may be entitled to consider instead " His 
performing this act is explained by his performing that 
one ", We are taking explanations, though, to relate
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statements, not acts or events, so this last would 
be more nroperly rendered " " He performed this act *’ 
is explained by " He performed that act " In this 
form, we are much more hapny to accept that this 
act might be identical with that one. Explanation 
of something under one description can quite commonly 
be provided by presenting that seme thing under a 
different description; And of course, we are to 
expect irreflexivity and asymmetry in explanation, 
this in no way entailing non-identity because of the 
intensionality of the context.
Goldman plays on the uncertain semantics of 
’by», and if uncertainty is removed in the way it has 
been here his argument falls. — There does, howeyer, 
seem to be non-equivalence between " John turned on 
the light by flipping the switch " and John turned 
on the light " is explained by ” John flipped the 
switch " ". It maj be argued that the space between 
these two arises because it amounts to an attempt to 
reduce an explanation of how something was done to an 
explained ^  relation holding between two sentences.
It is not necessary to enter discussion on the variety 
of possible forms of explanation, provided w$ may 
adopt the quite reasonable idea that explanation 
contexts generally are non-extensional, as it seems 
there is general agreement that ’by* establishes an 
explanation context. It is not always of the same 
sort, but there does not seem to be a usage which is
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not some kind of explanation context. Thus even If 
some of these contexts relate descriptions rather than 
sentences, I would argue that the choice of description 
to refer to the particular acts is an ingredient in the 
determination of the truth-value of the complete state­
ment. This being the case, the force of the argument 
is lost.
Regardless of the question of whether or not 
*by* contexts are themselves always, or ever, explanat­
ions, I think the surface form of the *by* statement is 
good evidence for the first term in the relation being 
a sentence. If it is accepted that the first term is 
a sentence, the thesis that it #  is, nevertheless, 
an extensional context can be undermined from a differ­
ent viewpoint. We may employ a device used in a 
Fregean argument oftèn cited by Davidson to show that 
the context fails to satisfy the principle of the 
intersubstitution of logically eouivalent sentences 
salva verltate. If we replace " John turned on the 
light " with the logically equivalent sentence 
" (lx)(x=2) = (^x)(x=2 & John turned on the light)" 
we end up with an absurdity; " (^x)(x~2) = ('?x)(x=2 
& John turned on the light) by flipping the switch. "
Defore leaving consideration of Goldman’s 
position, mention should be made of a ‘seemingly quite 
extraordinary argument he puts forward in defence of 
his ’fine-grained* approach to event-identity ( or, 
more correctly, act-identity, which is his particular
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concern ). "^ is approach may be criticised, fee eoye, 
for generating a proliferation of entitles; it may be 
said, even, that the furniture of the world would be 
increased to such an extent that an agent may be said 
to be performing at any given^moment indefinitely 
many acts, and this is surely ontologically unaccept­
able. He goes on:
• This objection is misguided. A fine-grained 
method of sct-lndividuation cannot justly be accused 
of ’increasing the furniture of the -Arorld,’ for such 
an approach would not countenance any entities that 
would not be admitted by a rival method of act- 
individuation. What, after all, ere the acts it 
would allow in its ontology? They are acts such as 
John’s moving his hand, John’s frightening away a fly, 
John’s moving his queen to king-knight-seven, John’s 
checkmating his opponent, etc. But surely these are 
all acts that would be countenanced by any theory v/hst* 
ever, including Davidson’s thesis. The bone of 
contention, then, is not whether these acts exist, but 
whether they are identical with one another. ’
Let us initially put to one side the minor point that
his way of speaking is, at the level of propaganda,
anti-Bavidsonian. Pormulstions like ’They are acts’,
’the acts it would allow’, and ’these are all acts’
suggest diversity at the noint of controversy where
Davidson asserts identity. But this is not the main
point; Goldman’s whole position here seems a little
silly; how many things there are Is the same problem
as how many distinct things there are, and while the
fine-grained approach is not under criticism for
recognising some spurious entities of a different
kind, it still offends against metaphysical
pareimoniousnesB within the field of acts and events,
for countenancing so many distinct things.
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There is one particular example that has 
become a focal point for the differences between 
Kim and Davidson; the example is this; is Brutus’ 
stabbing of Caesar identical or distinct from 
Brutus’ killing of Caesar? Davidson says they 
are identical; Kim denies this, but his reasons for 
this position seem rather weak;
’ Notice ••• that it is not at all absurd to 
say that Brutus’ killing Caesar is not the same as 
Brutus’ stabbing Caesar. Further, to explain Brutus’ 
killing Caesar ( why Brutus killed Caesar ) is not 
the same as to explain Brutus’ stabbing Caesar ( why 
Brutus stabbed Caesar
The first contention here only has force so long as no 
precise interpretation is given to the expression 
’same as’. The question is posed " The same what? ’ 
If the answer is " The same event ", no progress is 
made as this is what is in dispute; but no cluC is 
given to what else it might be. And anyway, while 
it might not be absurd to say they are not the same, 
it might nevertheless be false to say it.
The second contention, that the killing and 
the stabbing have different explanations, is no doubt 
true, but there is confusion in the notion of ’the 
explanation of an event’ if this fact is taken as 
showing that the killing is distinct from the stabb­
ing. If the question, " Nhy did event e occur? " 
arises, without any particular description attached 
to the reference to e, it seems we are left at a loss 
for a reply until \?e discover under what circumstances 
it would be deemed that e had not occurred. When we
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know this, I think an explanation may be given, 
for this will he satisfied if an explanation is 
given of why an event with a particular property or 
set of properties occurred. For example, suppose 
it is said, e would not have been said to have 
occurred if there had been no explosion of this 
magnitude, to explain why the particular event e 
occurred boils down to explaining why an event which 
was an explosion of this magnitude occurred. If we 
are faced with an explanation of why the avalanche 
occurred, we need to explain not only why an 
avalanche occurred, but also, why only one occurred, 
as Davidson has noticed. Thus the singularity is 
accounted for. However, I still think sense can be 
made of the assertion that these explanations fall 
short of explaining a particular event. ”'e have not 
explained why this explosion, or this avalanche 
occurred, and not another one. To provide an 
explanation of one unique event, we would need an 
explanation of all the properties of seme minimal set 
which together constitute a sufficient condition for 
that event; and in addition, an explanation would be 
required of why it was unique in some particular res­
pect. Of course, in some theories of events, any 
exclusion of this magnitude at place p and time t 
is identical with this one ( assuming it to have 
occurred at t and p ), but we are not compelled to
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adopt such a theory, however attractive it appears.
This is in line with Davidson’s outlook, 
explanations being conceived as relating statements, 
or properties, and events being explained under 
descriptions, not absolutely. Kim’s argument 
about the stabbing and the killing does not lend 
weight to the thesis that they are distinct, then, 
as Davidson would reply that this is best understood 
as one event being explained differently under 
different descriptions. Is Davidson correct about 
the identity of the killing and stabbing then? I
think there is good reason to doubt that he is.
We should look closely at the precise 
referents of the descriptions, ’Brutus’ stabbing 
of Caesar’ and ’Brutus’ killing of Caesar’. The 
immediate difficulty is that there are no rules laid 
down for the precise determination of boundaries of 
events, and as has been mentioned above, this is not 
a particularly tragic feature of event expressions and 
discourse. We may observe that it is not necessarily 
the case that everything mentioned in the description 
is completely in the event; ’the explosion at x’ is 
the same event as ’the explosion in the world at x’ 
but does not contain the whole world. We do not 
need all of Brutus in his stabbing of Caesar, then, 
but just enough of him to make it his stabbing.*^^
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Before continuing along the line of spatio- 
temporal location, it will prove useful to refine the 
example, and do away with some unfortunate historical 
details. This was no ordinary stabbing; in 
particular, Brutus was not alone. From this, I 
think we can show the stabbing and killing distinct, 
though not in the way originally desired. The first 
point in this demonstration is the contention that the 
killing of Caesar causes Caesar’s death. This in 
itself needs justification, as at first sight it would 
seem that a killing includes the death of the victim. 
Davidson has successfully shown, however, that this is 
not always the case, arguing that the conclusion of 
the following story is true:
* Suppose I pour poison in the water tank of a 
space ship while it stands on earth. My purpose is 
to kill the space traveller, and I succeed: when he
reaches Mars he takes a drink and dies. Two events 
are easy to distinguish: my pouring of the poison and
the death of the traveller. One precedes the other, 
and causes it. But where' does the event of my killing 
the traveller come in? The most usual answer is that 
my killing the traveller is identical with my pouring 
the poison. In that case, the killing is over when the
pouring is. ?’e are driven to the conclusion that I
have killed the traveller long before he dies. ’^
The conclusion is all the more easily taken when we
distinguish once again the event from the description
of the event. Perhaps we do not know it is a killing
until the spaceman is dead, but this does not stop it
being a killing if he does die from drinking the water.
The second point in the proof - that, historic­
ally, Brutus’ stabbing Caesar was distinct from Brutus’
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killing Caesar - is that Brutus* killing of Caesar 
caused Caesar’s death. There is a problem about 
the relation between the killing of Caesar and 
Brutus* killing of Caesar, but however this is 
resolved I do not think we will want to countenance 
any killing that does not cause the death of the 
killed. Let it be stipulated, with some justifica­
tion I hope, that Caesar’s death was over-determined 
causally, but for anyone to be x in the formulation 
*x’s killing of Caesar’ they have to have done 
sufficient to cause Caesar’s death. It may be 
objected that this makes the dastardly man who holds 
Caesar’s hands while the others stab him innocent.
Or perhaps more worrying is the fact that it might 
be said he is not innocent as in the circumstances of 
people thrusting knives in the direction of Caesar, 
he did enough to cause Caesar’s death. Such problems 
cannot be ignored, but surely it is possible ultimate­
ly to ask who was holding the knife; it is also 
possible that there is more than one who was, and 
finally, it is reasonable to say that only those 
in this category whose actions singly would have been 
sufficient to cause the death actually caused the death, 
others being ’ accomplicies ’ or whatever. It should 
be remembered that the concern here is completely 
exclusive of any morality; it may be as wicked, or 
even more wicked, to be an accomplice rather than the 
agent who is directly causally responsible.
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The final point in the proof is that Brutus’ 
stabbing Caesar did not cause Caesar’s death.
Brutus’ stabbing was, as Davidson himself says, 
literally, spatio-temporally, only part of the 
cause. The particular nature of the death Caesar 
suffered excludes its being the result of a single 
stabbing.
Now for this argument to be at all acceptable 
some more will need to be said about the relation 
between Bn;.tus’ killing Caesar and the killing of 
Caesar, for it may seem reasonable to say that, as 
with the stabbing and the cause of death, Brutus’ 
killing? Caesar was only a n%rt of the general kill­
ing. It is just this breakdown of the killing into 
constituent killings that I think is incoherent. 
Whether or not a man’s death is causally over- 
determined, he still only suffers one death, and 
whether or not a lot of people killed him, he still 
only suffers one killing. The upshot of this is 
that either Brutus’ killing is identified with the 
killing, or we stop talking about Brutus’ killing 
altogether. In the discussion under point two in 
this proof a criterion was given for valid instances 
’%’s killing of y’ for cases where many people were 
involved in y’s killing. The present discussion is 
urging that there is not a distinct event associated 
with each of these valid instances. This is not to 
argue that in general ’ x caused y" implies that x
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uniquely caused y; I do not want to consider this 
here. But in the particular case of killings and 
deaths, I think there is only one killing that causes 
a death.
To talk about Brutus’ killing of Caesar is 
midleading then, as the event referred to includes 
Cassius *^ nd all the others. It is the same event, 
in fact, as Cassius’ killing Caesar. Disagreements 
over this ouestion, however, do not seem to be in the 
mainstream of the disnute over the identity thesis 
about the killing and the stabbing. All the import­
ant issues there seem to be saved, and made clearer 
if we consider, instead of the historical killing of 
Caesar, the fabulous one in which Brutus kills him on 
his cm. In this case, and particularly in view of 
the foregoing discussion, is not Davidson’s position 
clearly correct?
It is now possible to return to the discussion 
of the location of theevents under consideration. The 
remarks about the whereabouts of Brutus’ stabbing of 
 ^ Caesar are as relevant to this exmmple as they are to 
the historical one. What conditions might there be 
on the location of the killing of Caesar? I think 
it is culte reasonable to stipulate that a killing 
involves the whole of the killed organism, just as 
the death of an organism does. For something to be 
killed is for the whole thing to undergo a significant
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change - for it to he diverted onto a more or less 
quick path to death. But is all Caesar’s body in 
Brutus’ stabbing of Caesar? Surely not; all that 
needs to be within this event is that part of his 
body into which the knife was nluhged. Just as it 
seems that the arm holding the knife has to be 
attached to Brutus’ body for it to be Brutus’ 
stabbing, without all of Brutus’ body being part of 
the stabbing, so Caesar’s back only needs to be in 
fact Caesar’g back for it to be_a stabbing ( into the 
back ) of Caesar. I claim then, that the stabbing 
and killing are distinct.
Given the conditions of adequacy that have 
been laid do%vn, this gory business unfortunately can­
not be left here. Identity has been denied in 
accordance with (C?) - variation in location. Now 
unless we can find a difference in their places in 
the causal framework we are in danger of not meeting 
(04) from the other side; that is, we might be unable 
to show two distinct things do not have the same 
causal role. In the light of the spatio-temporal 
divergence, though, a difference can probably be 
described; for example we might say that the stabbing 
caused a dislocation in the spine, but rather than say 
the killing caused this, say instead this was part of 
the killing. However, outside the immediate events
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in Caesar’s body, the killing and the stabbing do have 
extremely close causal consequences.
A second example that has caused much 
controversy is the relation between the death of 
Socrates and Xantippe’a becoming a widow. Here, 
again, I think an identity claim can be shown to 
contravene the conditions of adequacy, contrary to 
Davidson. The location of Socrates' death does not 
seem to give rise to any particular difficulties - 
it occurs where he is. Xantipne’s becoming a widow 
is h-arder, because the determination of its location 
requires us to decide how to cope with the fact that, 
as described, the event amounts to a change in an 
( ’external’ ) relation of hers, a change furthermore 
to which she seems at the time to contribute nothing 
#  at all. Her only significance seems to be her 
part in a marriage ceremony in the past. Neverthe­
less, in a way similar to that in which I might wit­
ness an event which I only discover later, and could 
only discover later, was a killing, I could observe 
Xantippe's becoming a widow, without knowing until 
later that it amounts to that. Say Socrates dies at t; 
then her becoming a widow might be identical with the 
event Xantippe’s sleeping at t. If Xantippe is to 
be the subject of the event, which does not seem to me 
to be at all strange, then it occurs where she is, and 
while the change in relations she holds is in this case
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e very nebulous one, ( though dependent on a physical 
change in someone else ), it is for all that no less 
a genuine change. An analogy may be considered; 
suppose T pick out from a collection of books a single 
one with the description ’the one I bought from Jones’; 
you cannot tell from the collection which one it is, 
but if there is in the collection only one X bought 
from Jones, there Is nothing wrong with the description; 
Equally, if we take all the events conetitutlhg 
Xantip^e's life, and call one of them her becoming a 
widow, you will be unable to tell precisely, perhaps, 
which one it is I am referring to; but this dees not 
bring into question the validity of the description as 
a description for the event, which crudely is simply the 
t-time slice of Xantippe.
I %"^ 11 take the denial of the identity argument 
in the two cases I have considered here to be concrete 
conditions of adeouacy for the analysis to be proposed, 
arising from (Cl) - (C4). A third, and final example 
provides a case where the analysis is reouired to 
assert, rather than deny, an identity. It is an 
examnle that Davidson raises without himself casting 
A final judgment. He asks us to imagine a metal ball 
that becomes vp.rmev during a. given minute m, and that 
during the same minute rotates through T5 degrees.
Is the warming of the ball during m identical with the
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rotation of the ball during m? If not we ore in 
danger of having to abandon (03). The example ie 
raised to give expression to Davidson's doubt about 
whether or not identity of apace and tine is enough 
to ensure identity, but he does point to a way out 
of the paradox. It may be argued that the warming 
and the rotation of the ball are identical with the 
notions of the molecules constituting the ball during 
5 , and thus are themselves identical. within the 
context of the discussion so far, with no considera­
tion of modal contexts, and concern exclusively with 
spatio-temporal particulars, I think this argument 
has sufficient force for the identity claim to hold. 
However, the analysis to be presented here le to be 
expected to throw further light on this example, 
particularly as it contains an element associated 
with the stategic problem of emergence and reduction- 
ism. To sec the thing as a ball is different from 
seeing it as a collection of particles, and the rela­
tion between these viewpoints is, basically, an 
instance of the basic problem. For example, iti
might be claimed, in an attempt to make Zddington 
sound less sensationalist, that the property of 
solidity has supervened on this collection of mole­
cules. There is fairly strong evidence for a very 
strong relatloh, in fact identity, to be gold to 
hold between heat and the motion of molecules; 
the fact that the same may be said of rotation also
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lends support to the reductionist argument of 
Davidson/^ But the defence is only of this particular 
reduction, not the theory in general. About this, 
the theory of events should remain neutral.
Ill
It is not possible here to investigate all 
the possible modal implications of (C3) and (C4); 
There is however a tendency to treat them as though 
they imply that location, causes ànd effects are 
necessary properties of spatio-temporal particulars; 
that, for example, an event could not but have the 
causes and effects it has, or could not but have the 
location it has. Thus these properties are treated 
as though they are of the type that fits statement- 
form (?3). This amounts to the conditions being 
taken instead to be
(C3*) (u)(v)(p)(t)(( Pu & Pv )4( u = v<»o( Oupt & 
Ovpt )))
(C4*) (u)(v)( u = vOo(w)(x)(( Ruw<->Rvw ) & ( Rxu 
Rxv )))
withn’understood typically as *in all possible worlds 
where the particulars are present*. It seems quite 
likely that this is what lies behind the modal 
assertion at the end of this passage from Davidson’s 
’Causal Relations’!
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’ Mackie asks, " What is the exact force of 
the statement of some experts that this short- 
circuit caused this fire? " And he answers, " Clearly 
the experts are not saying that the short-circuit was 
a necessary condition for this house's catching fire at 
this time; they know perfectly well that a short- 
circuit somewhere else, or the overturning of a light­
ed oil stove.mi^ht, if it had occurred, have set the 
house on fire "...Suppose the experts know what they 
are said to; how does this bear on the question 
whether the short-circuit was a necessary condition of 
this particular fire? For a short-circuit elsewhere 
could not have caused this fire, nor could the over­
turning of a lighted oil stove. ’
Why not? Presumably because for anything to be this 
fire, it has to have the same cause as this one. But 
this is surely far too strong. -Vhy couldn't a short- 
circuit elsewhere have caused this fire? A.nd indeed, 
it is only if his own criterion of event-identity is
misread do we have to deny this possibility.
A further example may be considered. Take 
one particular event - the explosion in the chemistry 
laboratory at t. It was caused by Jones' mixing
samples of a and b in the laboratory just before t.
Among its effects were the destruction of the 
laboratory, the death of Jones, and Smith being made 
to jump. He was passing the laboratory at the time 
and as usual he was looking at it because he found 
it so aesthetically pleasing.
T think we may set, as conditions of 
adequacy on the theory of possibility to be present 
in the analysis of events below, the requirement that, 
with reference to this example, the following are
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deemed to be true: " The explosion might not have
caused Fmith to jump "; " The explosion might have 
been n suicide, or Jones might have made a mistake 
" The explosion could have happened a few moments 
earlier " The explosion could have damaged the 
refectory " {^assuming that it in fact did not ).
I shall preface the presentation of the 
analysis of events with a consideration of the source 
from which one feature of it is derived, which is 
some side remarks in a hook otherwise devoted to the 
formal analysis of English.
In his hook * logics and Languages * Cress-
v/ell'indulges from time to time, as he says, in a
3Z
little speculative metaphysics. The purpose of this 
is to investigate the nature of the entities required 
for the semantical analysis of language, and as these 
remarks are supposed to be of only an illustrative 
nature I think it is reasonable to take some of them 
out of context, and while criticizing them, use them 
nevertheless as s basis for an analysis of the sort 
desired here, which is capable of playing more than a 
purely Illustrative role.
The set of entities of particular concern here 
which he describes are called basic individuals. He 
begins with the set of all space-time points, and 
defines a possible world to be any subset of this set. 
The set of basic individuals, comprising physical
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objects, events, states, processes, and so on* is 
defined as follows: a basic individual is a function
from a world to a part of that world - clearly, there­
fore, this is a function from possible worlds to 
possible worlds, with the condition that the value 
for each world is a subset of that world. These 
values are space-time portions, and if we are consider­
ing some world where a particular basic individual 
does not exist, the value of the function comprising 
that individual will in that world be the null set.
The value of a function in a world is called the 
manifestation of that individual in that world.
Cresswell assumes that for each point of 
space-time there are only two possible states - 
either occupied by matter, or unoccupied by matter. 
Sometimes he writes as though a world is defined as 
a set of space-time points all occupied by matter; 
it would seem much more convenient, though, for him 
to identify a world by citing the set of points which 
comorises it, and then to say just which of these points 
are occupied.
The major reason for interest in Cresswell*s 
proposals is that he claims they provide an indication 
of the way to solve the problem of saying wh=»t is right 
and what is wrong with the statement (1) The battle of 
Waterloo is nothing more than a certain movement of 
elementary physical particles.
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(1), he says, is true in the sense that the value cf 
the individual called the battle of "'aterloo in the 
real world, and indeed in any world is a movement of 
elementary physical particles ...
• However, (1) taken in another way is false.
This is because we can also understand the particular 
movement of elementary particles in a particular 
world as an event. If we can accept an absolute 
space-time framework then we can form the function 
whose value for any world is the set of space-time 
points which is TTïe value in the actual world of the 
battle of Waterloo function. It is functions of this 
kind which mightbe said to represent absolutely physical 
individuals, and if (1) is meant to assert the identity 
of the battle of Waterloo and the absolutely physical 
individual which coincides with it in the real world 
then (1) is false, since although the battle of Waterloo 
has a manifestation ( possible null ) in each world it 
need not be the same manifestation in each; and this is 
why seeing it as a battle is different from seeing its 
manifestation as an absolutely physical event. *
I will try to show that there is a great deal 
of confusion in the v.ay that Creeswell proposes 
individuals may be constructed, and his account seems 
to involve a series of counterintuitive positions, 
which will be investigated more fully later. However,
I think this passage shows that within a framework of 
the sort he suggests it is possible to provide 
clarification of some important features of the precise 
way an emergentist metaphysics might be rigorously 
worked out. In particular, we may draw, on the basis 
of this passage, a vital distinction between two 
properties that might both go by the name ’physical’.
The battle of Waterloo may, in one sense, be called 
physical^ and essentially so^  in so far as its
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manifestation in any world is a physical thing; how­
ever, there are no oarticular physical entities - atoms 
or whatever - that are identical with the battle, that 
always constitute it wherever it is manifested. The 
constraints on what might constitute the manifestation 
of the battle in any world are not of this physical 
sort, but are, rather, concerned with features like 
the size of the battle, and its place in the historical 
causal framework.
These issues will be discussed more fully 
later, but we need to consider Cresswell*s o?m 
comments cn the ascrintion of properties to events, 
which do not themselves seem to get us very far to­
wards an explication of the notion of emergence.
The arguments he presents which are of most importance 
here are contained in the following, somewhat lengthy 
passage :
* Surely a function from worlds to worlds is a 
very rarefied and abstract object? Do not nominalists 
fight shy of admitting sets and functions into their 
ontology and only do so reluctantly when forced? Yet 
they certainly believe in blackboards. The view that 
a function from worlds to worlds is an abstract entity 
is a nuestion-begging one if being an abstract entity 
rules out being also a physical object. For on the 
analysis I am proposing some functions from worlds to 
worlds are physical objects and so the right conclusion 
is that not all such functions are abstract entities.
The objection must say more. The objection must hold 
that the nature of ordinary physical objects ond events 
is well enough known to show that they behave in certain 
ways in which set-theoretical entities do not behave; 
and I would maintain that this cannot be showyi-
T recognize of course and have freouently been 
stressing that the analysis I am proposing is subject to 
philosophical scrutiny. But it must not be facile
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scrutiny. As an example of facile scrutiny 
consider the following, equally cuestion-hegging, 
instance of the general argiment outlined above; 
the objection is that physical objects cannot be 
sets, because we can perceive physical objects through 
the senses. But whoever saw a set coming down the 
road? The question here is begged because whatever 
the analysis of "seeing* is in terms of the metaphysics 
I have been sketching, it will at least be a 1j^-place 
property and there is no reason why the proposdon m  
sees (a,b)"should not be true in a world w where a and 
b are sets. ..As far as the set cominr down the ro"ad is 
concerned, one mightwell be prepared to say that one 
sees a set of three men coming down" the road because 
one sees each of the men. I.e. for some sets, al­
though the set is distinct from its members yet to see 
the set is just to see the members. But in any case 
the question is not whether anyone ?;ould be happy to 
say that a thing is a set or a function; the question 
is whether it i^ a set or a function. *
Prom the point of view of the method of 
constructional definition, and from the point of view 
of the analysis of events, the two passages that have 
been quoted from Cresswell, confused though they are, 
deserve close scrutiny. We may attempt a logical 
reconstruction of Cresswell"s development of these 
proposals. V/e wish to take events, physical objects, 
and so on, to be spatio-temporal particulars, let us 
suppose even spacc-time slices; I think it likely 
that Cresswell thinks we take them to be this last, 
which in his analysis constitute the manifestations 
of individuals in worlds; for exaranle, with reference 
to a particular blackboard, he describes its 
manifestation in the real world as "that subset of 
space-time which makes up the blackboard throughout 
its history*. Now we face certain problems; we 
want to be able to talk about properties that an 
individual might have but does not have, and also 
about Individuals which do not in fact exist. More
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particularly it is necessary to construct a framework 
in which sense can be made of the question, ” Would 
the blackboard have been better placed near the 
window? ". It is implausible, Cresswell argues, to 
identify the blackboard with its manifestation, 
because we cannot ask this question of a space-time 
slice.
One point may be raised here, to digress for 
8 moment. It might not be reasonable to ask this 
cf a space-time slice, but it might be reasonable to 
ask it of the contents of that slice. Of course, it 
will not be asked of the contents of the slice which 
covers the entire historical existence of the black­
board, but rather of the contents of the slice cover­
ing the blackboard during the course, perhaps, of the 
lesson in which information for students is written on 
it, and where it is located in a dark corner of the 
room. This is only a suggestion, and is in no way 
supposed to sort out the problems of talk about three- 
dimensional objects in our four-dimensional world.
I
^hat is at stake, though, is the ascription of possible 
properties, and naturally enough there is an air of 
incoherence about attributing a possible property of 
alternative location to a space-time slice; not so 
much, though, to a material entity jji a space-time slice 
To pose the rroblem of possible properties as one 
arising from the identification of spatio-temporal
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things like blackboards ( that is, for Cresswell, 
the manifestations of blackboards ) with space-time 
slices requires some justification for this assumed 
identity.
Now it may be argued that Cresswell, in 
talking of a space-time slice, is talking of the 
slice with matter in it, and so to make this 
distinction between a space-time slice and the matter 
in it is not germane to the analysis; further, it 
would be said, Cresswell is right to say the question 
about the preferred location of the blackboard can­
not be asked of the space-time slice viewed in his 
way as already containing matter. In reply, the 
point to be made is this: Cresswell may be trying
to sell the manifestations of individuals as being 
the same sort of thing as we ordinarily understand 
by individuals, and this is not the case. We take 
them as spatio-temporal entities, certainly, but with 
things like physical objects these are, in our concept­
ion, objects which can quite plausibly change location, 
unlike a space-time slice. In his account, no 
mention is made of this crucial difference. Further­
more, if Cresswell does consider manifestations to 
diverge from our ordinary notion of individuals, his 
account is deficient in that it offers no account of 
how things like blackboards, as conceived by us, and 
movable in space, fit in to the picture he presents.
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To return to the mainstream of discussion, 
Fiven all the problems to be met by the analysis of 
events, Cresswell proposes that events are Identified 
with functions from possible worlds to possible 
worlds, as described above. There is no problem 
with this; it would be facile indeed to object that 
set-theoretic functions are not the sort of things 
that events are, as we understand them; as stated 
above, this sort of criticism misses the point of 
the method of constructional definition in philosophy. 
Te may note, though, that little sense can be made of 
the question, ” ^ould it have been better placed near 
the window? ”, when it is asked of a function from 
possible worlds to possible worlds. Indeed, no more 
sense can be made of this than of the question’s beihg 
asked of a slice of space-time. This observation 
should not come as any surprise, for it has been 
shown that constructional definitions arê not 
intended to serve the purpose of replacing the 
definiendum by the definiens in all the relevant 
contexts, but of providing translations of those 
contexts in line with the definitions, and then 
comparing the truth-values in particular translations 
with the originals. Cresswell, however, seems to 
prefer the ascription to the function of all those 
properties that were formerly attributed to the black­
board, and this wowld seem to lead us to absurdities.
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To expand; there are certain metaphysical 
assumptions which are very broadly acceptable and 
which concern the sort of entity that might be said 
to have certain properties. To contradict such 
assumptions would demand at least an argument to 
defend such a procedure. Referring to the last 
quoted passage in the light of these assumptions, 
it is difficult to make sense of a statement like 
” The view that a function from worlds to worlds 
is an abstract entity is a question-begging one 
if being an abstract entity rules out being also a 
physical object. ” One thing that cannot be 
doubted is that such functions ere abstract
entities; ambiguities in the word ’abstract*,
!
such as they are, will not be resolved with the 
result that such functions are not considered 
abstract. Now it would seem from the name, that 
physical objects are not abstract entities, as 
we conceive them, but Cresswell may construetionally 
define them as these functions. But what he cannot 
do is then say these functions hold properties like 
weight, temperature, volume, or, in the case of events, 
duration. To do so would be to contradict those 
assumptions of property-holding that have just been 
alluded to. How could a function get hot? It is 
not composed of molecules. Cresswell seems to be 
ignoring the second stage in the analysis; if we are 
going to provide a theory of events, we need, as an 
integral part of that endeavour, to provide a theory of 
property ascription for events as well.
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It may be objected that this involves a 
misconstrual of Cresswell*s intentions. But if this 
is the case, why, in the laet paragraph of thelast 
quoted rassage, is there an argument that seems to 
be trying to give some plausibility to the notion 
that we might on occasion be prepared to say that one 
sees a set coining down the road? And according to the 
remarks immediately preceding this argument, it 
seems this thinking, seeing thing seeing a set coining 
down the road is also a set! I protest, and yet,in 
the context theargument seems to have the purpose of 
lending plausibility to the even more extraordinary 
idea that we sometimes - in fact, commonly - see 
functions from possible worlds to possible worlds 
coming down the road. It eeemi^unsurprising to me 
that it clearly falls to lend any plausibility at 
all to such a proposition.
None of this, it should be stressed, is 
meant to bring into question the value of set- 
theoretical frameworks in the analysis of statements 
with forms (B1 - (F4). But it is precisely such an 
analysis, given the framework established, that is 
missing from Cresswell*s account.
Bearing all this in mind, it will be useful 
to look more closely at just how far Cresswell has 
taken us in the solving of problems associated with 
(1). Te start with the problem that while the 
Battle of Waterloo and a certain movement of
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elementary physical particles share the same location 
in time and space, they seem to be different sorts of 
thing, and so a question mark is placed over the state­
ment of identity between them. Cresswell attempts to 
solve this by his framework of individuals, as 
functions, and their manifestations. He distinguishes 
two different functions, one- which has as its 
manifestation, where this is not the null set, the 
battle of Waterloo, and another which has as 
manifestation invariably across worlds the movement 
of elementary physical particles associated with the 
battle in the real world. However, at the spatio- 
temporal level, this association is taken always to be 
identity and no more is said about it. The value of 
the individual called the battle of "aterloo, he has 
written, in any world ^  a movement of particles.
There is, in fact, incoherence in the 
construction of the 'absolutely physical individual* 
function, which will be described later. Leaving 
this aside, it is clear already that Cresswell is 
not going to tackle one feature of the problem of 
emergentism, that being this identity of the battle of
Waterloo and the movement of elementray physical
')
particles, conceived as manifestations in space-time.
I
The distinction he draws between the two remains entirely 
at the level of individuals conceived as functions, and 
this does seem to leave an important remainder of the 
problem unconsidered. Of course, we are working within
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the framework of (05), end so it is not the case 
that the identity of the ( spatio-temporal ) battle 
and ( spatio-temporal ) movement of particles can be 
questioned; however, I hope to show that even within 
this framework, it may he possible to incorporate an 
emergentist theory of levels, though such a theory 
would be much weaker than some which seem to imply 
a denial of (03).
However* there is a way of presenting a 
Cresswellian picture that does incorporate an insight.
To show this, first let us take necessary properties 
to be simply those which a thing must have if it is 
to be that thing; that is, in any world where that 
thing exists, it has these properties; contingent 
properties are those which are not necessary. A 
second distinction, to be drawn only roughly, is 
derived from Leibniz, end is between those properties 
intrinsic to a thing, and those that are external, or 
relational. For example, in Cresswell*s picture, the 
structure of matter in a manifestation, the ascription 
of ’occupied* or *unoccupied’ to each point in the 
manifestation, would exhaust a description of the 
intrinsic properties of that manifestation.
What Cresswell*8 framework could be said to 
show is that the (spatio-temporal) battle and the (spatio- 
temporal ) movement of elementary particles draw the line 
between necessary and contingent properties at different 
places. The interpretation of his account I have in 
mind is as follows; Let us say there is m-identity across 
worlds between manifestations if they are manifestations 
of the same individual function; and from our definition
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of necessary properties, we will be able to read off the 
necessary properties of m-identical things by observing 
what properties each manifestation of the function in 
ouestion has in every world.
Fow Cresswell, under this interpretation, may 
be taken as identifying the necessary properties of 
a movement of particles with the intrinsic properties of 
that movement, as there is by definition identity 
between the manifestations of the absolutely physical 
individual. This is almost certainly too strong.
But let us not debate this; suppose he is right: 
something along the same lines, though much weaker, 
probably is right. I assume that the battle of 
Waterloo has very different necessary properties; 
the battle could have been fought by a completely 
different set of men. It could have lasted a longer 
or shorter time, and covered more or less ( geographical ) 
snace.
As for its necessary properties - that it was 
fought between Bngland and France, that it was not just 
a skirmish, and so on - these are not related directly 
with any particular movement of elementary particles.
The relation ’having different necessary 
properties from * is a relation that holds, then, 
between the spatio-temporal battle and the spatio- 
temporal movement of particles. A simple and straight- 
forv/ard assertion of identity between these things, like
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Cresswell*s, seems, then, to be failing to grasp the 
complexity of their spatio-temporal coincidence, given 
the modal features of the situation just referred to. 
’‘'Tiile this presentation is of course not one that 
Cresswell himself adopts, any light it throws on the 
difficulties of a rigid reductionism, when modal 
properties are taken into account, has its source 
in the framework he constructs.
This survey of Cresswell*s proposals may be 
ended with a look at some of the more dubious features 
of his apparatus, which will act as an introduction to 
the analysis to be presented here. There are four 
points I want to note*
Firstly, it seems strange to take possible 
worlds as subsets of the set of all space-time points. 
The very construction of this set seems obscure; 
apparently one subset of it is the real world, in 
which case it would be useful to know how to get all 
the other members of the set that are not in this 
subset, the real world. Are they possible points?
And is it the case that one subset can have different 
arrangements of matter in it? The account is, in 
fact, seriously deficient in the provision of these 
basic set-theoretic details.
We are much better served by the assumption 
mentioned above drawn from Kaplan, that we take space­
time, and certain of its basic geometric properties, 
to be features of all possible worlds. Thus what
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goes on in different nossible worlds is not seen as 
happening in a space-time different from that in the 
real world, and correctly so. If I say ” Nixon might 
not have won the election ” I have in mind a course of 
development thatthis world, taken crudely as a space­
time receptacle, might have followed; I am not think­
ing of possible events taking place 'somewhere else*. 
Again, in most circumstances when a counterfactual 
situation is alluded to which is not overtly about 
possible courses of development of the real world, 
there is no need for this to be conceived as occurring 
in an alternative space-time. The assumption adopted 
here about space-time clearly does exclude the 
possibility of accommodating talk about different 
space-times, or alternative geometrical structures 
for this, or another, space-time, but this, I feel, 
is no great short-coming. A question mark hangs 
over discourse about such bizarre possibilities any-
r
way, and even if it eventually attained credibility, '
!
the assumption could at that stage be dropped and the 
analysis modified accordingly.
Secondly, and arising from one feature of the 
previous point, Cresswell's matter that does the 
occupying of spacè-time is left in a haze of confus­
ion. His account is basically materialist, and I 
am in sympathy with such an approach, but there does 
seem to be some naivety in his account. Matter appears 
to be a collection of homogenous point-occupying bits. 
Indistinguishable one from another, but this seems
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not only unacceptable, but as I hope to show, un­
necessary as well.
Thirdly, reference was made earlier to an 
incoherence in the construction of the function he 
calls an absolutely physical individual. This, it 
will be recalled, had the same manifestation in each 
world, but on his account there are worlds which do 
not even contain the space-time slice constituting 
this manifestation, because of Cresswell*s extremely 
broad definition of possible world, as any subset of 
the set of all space-time points.
Cresswell*s purpose would, in fact, have been 
served by a function characterised with slightly more 
complexity. Clearly, we can conceive of the same 
matter in the same structure occupying different 
portions of space-time in different worlds. The 
absolutely physical individual function could then be 
constructed as having as manifestation, in any world 
where it existed, the same matter in the same structure, 
somewhere within the world, as the manifestation in the 
real world coinciding with the battle of Waterloo.
With a construction such as this, intrinsic properties 
of the manifestation are left invariant, which is the 
essence of Cresswell*s point.
Fourthly, as he has characterised them, there 
are a vast number of individuals. He asks us to ” Note 
that our range of basic individuals is far wider than 
any ordinary notion of things ”, and a little later on
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asserts ” -^e have said that physical things have the 
status of functions of a certain kind. There Is now 
the quite different problem of marking off those which 
human beings can recognize as things. About this 
problem we refuse to pronounce... ” We may reasonably 
object to this; while it is a different problem from 
the construction of individual functions, it is still 
the responsibility of metaphysics to go some way at 
least towards drawing a boundary between those functions 
that can reasonably be called individuals, and those 
that can't; ^Ithout this, the category of 'basic 
individual' is all the less interesting. For example, 
we can imagine a function which may be described as 
follows: in the real world, it has as manifestation
a four-second slice of an atom in Fngl and in 1976, and 
a ten-second slice of a neutron in France in 1679; in 
all other worlds it has the null-set as manifestation.
I think it a matter of ontological fact that this 
function is not an individual, regardless of human 
powers or capacities. A preliminary theory of 
individuals should, then, at the very least, assert 
that only a subset of this class of functions are 
individuals.
These observations are sufficient, T think, 
to show that any adequate theory of events is going to 
involve much more precision and working out than Cress-^ 
well provides. iThile the account to be presented her^ 
is considerably different from Cresswell*s, his account
i \ "
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was nevertheless the basic impetus for it, providing 
the idea of identifying the individual with a set- 
theoretical function which has a set of possible worlds 
as its domain.
As has been made clear, a theory of events 
should hot, I think, venture to give an answer to the 
problems of either reductionism or emergentism; rather 
it should remain neutral, leaving room for either. We 
need, though, to bear in mind the conditions (Cl) - (03), 
and any room for emergentism that we leave is not to 
allow the possibility of there being two distinct things 
at the same place in space-time. On the other hand, 
while I intend to provide a basically materialist 
account, it must not be so crude or naive as to imply 
a strong reductionism, or a refutation of emergentism.
The following is supposed to be no more then a 
first step towards a theory of events, and as such 
displays, in places, some crudity. To satisfy complete­
ly conditions (FI) - (F4) requires, I think, a theory of 
quite broad scope, particularly, as I hope to show, it 
is not possible to give a general account of the 
properties events hold, as they fall into kinds which 
have significantly different features. It is hoped that 
at least some headway is mede in distinguishing these 
kinds, and the beginnings of an analysis of them 
presented.
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The set-theoretical framework I am propesing 
is as follows: we take a non-empty s e t W o f  possible
worlds, a non-empty set of point-masses, and a non­
empty set ê  of space-time points.
?7e assume ^  has a geometry, according to the 
assumption from Kaplan.
For each w e Vif there is a function
such that for all a € , there is an e € (^ such tliat
f^(a) = e.
For any world w e V l f  is called the distribution 
function for w. We consider a class of functions G, 
from worlds to regions of space-time and the null set; 
thus for each g€G,
gt W  (&Cé) o f\)
A subset of G, at present undefined, is called the set
3S
of events. For each event g let there be a function 
from worlds to sets of point-masses hg such that 
hg(w) = ^ a fjR,: f*(a) e g(w) ^
The value of hg for a world has a geometry, restricted 
from that on ^  . Intuitively, the values of hg are 
sets of point-masses structured according to their place 
in space-time. For each g, w, hg(w) is called the
physical manifestation of g in w.
For each hg(w), there is an infinite series of 
partitioning processes. At one extreme, the resultant 
partition does not divide the physical manifestation at 
all, viewing it in its entirety as a unity. At the other
- 64 -
extreme, the resultant nartition is one that partitions 
the physical manifestatioh into its individual point- 
nasses. All possibilities between these two extremes 
are included in the series of partitioning processes.
For any partition, each part of the physical manifestation 
partitioned off from the rest of the manifestation is 
itself called an event, or sometimes, for clarity, a 
sub-event.
shall take, as a primitive, undefined feature 
of each world w, that world’s causal history, consisting 
of a series of causal chains, and such that for some 
partition or partitions of each hg(w), the events 
constituting hg(w) according to that partition or those 
partitions are each a stage^in some causal chain in the 
causal history of that world.
Partitioning processes are themselves ordered 
according to a hierarchy of levels. Fach event has 
associated with it a partitioning process of some given 
level.
This account embodies materialism in so far as 
it Implies that for any world, if everything in the 
domain of the distribution function for that world is 
taken out - that is, if all the matter is removed - the 
result is an empty world. Events are construed as a 
subset of functions from worlds to regions of space- 
time. For any particular world w, we may determine 
for any given event e the physical manifestation of e 
in w by means of the distribution function, and the
— 65 —
function he. The physical manifestation of an event 
in a world is the structured set of point-masses within 
the space-time region that constitutes the value of the 
event-function at that world.
The operation of partitioning processes are best 
explained with reference to some particular examples, 
though it may he conceived simply as a four-dimensional 
version of dividing a two-dimensional closed shape into 
various spatial regions. At one extreme, no partitioning 
lines are drawn through the,area of the shape; at the 
other extreme, the basic constitutents of the shape, 
however they are conceived, are partitioned individually 
by the dividing lines. And so, for example, the battle 
of Waterloo may be seen, at one extreme, as a unity, as 
that one thing which is that (spatio-temporal) event; 
at the other extreme, alternatively, it may be viewed 
as all those point-masses constituting the physical 
manifestation.
As a first approximation, we may characterize 
one of the interesting partitions between these two 
extremes as one which views the physical manifestation 
as a series of elementary particles in motion through 
time. This is not quite accurate, though, for all we 
have within the boundaries of the event are tifae-slicea 
of particles, not complete particles. Another interest­
ing partition includes the treating of all the men - or 
more accurately, man-slices - within the boundaries of the 
event as partitioned-off sub-events, the battle here being
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1
viewed as a gigantic, complex relation of violence and
36
fighting between a series of men.
Of course, there are an infinite number of 
possible nartitions, and the great majority of them 
will not bear fruit, the criterion for which is the 
generation of sub-events which have a place - as a 
stage - in the causal history of the world.
Something needs to be said about physical 
objects. In a fashion akin to Cresswell, let us 
assume, firstly, that conceived as four-dimensional 
things - intuitively, objects through time - they are 
like the physical manifestations of event functions.
In fact, an extension of the theory of events provided 
here would identify particular physical objects and 
people with functions like events. Now let us 
consider a four-dlmen'sionel person, Jones, end 
partition him accordingly so he is conceived as a 
series of tlme-slices. An important feature of 
our intuitions about people is expressed by the fact 
that we are uninclined to call the event Jones* waving 
goodbye at t, the event ’t-slice of Jones waving goodbye*. 
Whether or net they are identical, it seems to me, depends 
on whether reductionism, in the form of reducing a person 
to the scries of events constituting the time-elices of 
his life, is or is not true. If it is false, and some­
thing like our intuitions is right, perhaps we would say
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that being able to wave goodbye tob a property only 
held by people, and if it had not been a person, but 
a machine that looked like a man, we might have been 
more happy to say it was the time slice of the machine 
that was waving its arm, leaving out of the description 
the implied intention in the description ’waving 
goodbye *.
In the case cf four-dimensional physical objects, 
then, v/e^ can see one way the picture presented here 
leaves room for emergentism, and this indicates how 
it might generally be adopted into the account of events. 
The clue is in our descriptions, an example of ^ich we 
have just used. To call the event ’Jones’ waving goodbye’ 
involved us in looking beyond the boundaries of the event, 
and locating it in a framework of conscious animals 
going through changes and actions; the time-slice of 
Jones is taken as Jones at a time, and in such a way 
that it la not necessarily the case that he is reducible 
to all his time-slices. We could say, more closely to 
the language used in the presentation of the analysis 
here, that the description locates the event in a  ^,
historical causal chain.
The emergentist may then construct a metaphysics 
like this: firstly, he identifies within the causal
history of the world strands which are interlinked but 
nevertheless maintain some degree of autonomy from each 
other. These are viewed as in a hierarchy, from lower
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to higher levels of complexity, determined with 
reference to the structure of matter. Secondly, he 
may conceive of there being a parallel hierarchy for 
partitions. Not all partitions will he found within 
this framework, hut only a subset of them, namely those 
which give rise, in their application, to sub-events 
that play a part in the world's causal history. In a 
particular case, he may then argue as follows: we may
consider the battle of Waterloo in at least three ways: 
as 'the battle', as a series of men fighting, and as a 
series of molecules in motion; For each of these 
views, there are events ( functions ) which all share 
the same value at the real world, but, having as they 
do different necessary properties, have divergent values 
at some other worlds. Each partitions its physical 
manifestation differently, but all do it successfully, 
in the sense that they all give rise to sub-events that 
have a place in the causal history of the world. The 
places each has, though, are in different causal chains, 
which, as stated above are interlinked but nevertheless 
are not all collapsible into one another.
This last point is the crux of the emergentist 
position. The reductionist is not likely to waste his 
time questioning whether or not we can distinguish a 
hierarchy of what are commonly called 'levels of inte­
gration* of matter; by this I mean we can simply accept 
that there are, for example, levels corresponding to 
inorganic matter, living things, and conscious things.
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To recognize these divisions is not to adopt emergentism.
The question of emergentism is most clearly formulated as 
one about the relation between those levels, whether or 
not each has a degree of autonomy over those lower than 
it in the hierarchy.
The picture of the world present here - neutral 
as regards reductionism - may be viewed thus: there is
we suppose, some level at which everything in the world 
would be gone if we removed a series of objects conceived 
86 four-dimensional spatio-temporal entities. There 
is, that is, a set of manifestations that exhaust the 
world, in this sense, say the set that would intuitively 
be called the set of all elementary particles throughout 
the time dimension of the world. Constructed out of this 
set, though not exhausting it, are two series of 
qualitatively different sorts of objects corresponding 
to physical objects of medium size, and animals, through 
time. Animals themselves contain the qualitatively
different subset-conscious animals. Manifestations of
!
the first sort are characterised by very long time \ 
dimensions, and ones of objects and animals by relative» 
ly long time dimensions. Most events, as we understand 
them, cut across this characterisation of the world, haying 
as a rule relatively short duration, and constituting often
i
■ t
time-slices of these objerts; one property, commonly,iis 
true of the object during the time-slice. So, for example, 
Jones' waving goodbye is a time slice of Jones in which it
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is true of him that he is waving goodbye, and it is 
the only time that it is true of him, in that temporal 
region. We could, to be sure, take a set of events 
the removal of which would leave nothing in the world, 
but some of these are liable to be of very odd 
construction, and difficult to describe. The picture 
of objects being the basic furniture of the world is a 
more stable and more easily described account.
Let us look more closely at the value of a 
typical event at some world, taking as given a prior 
classification of the world,into a series of objects of 
various levels. #hat taking this amounts to is the 
assumption that the world has a natural partitioning 
attached to it; clearly our perceptual apparatus may 
be coneeived as providing something like this. As has 
been described already, there are various ways this slice 
of space-time can be lèoked at - depending particularly on 
what level of objects are of interest. Some clarification 
Is still needed, though, of the extreme partition that ■ 
does not draw dividing lines in the area of the event; . 
for example, what is it to conceive of the battle of ; 
Waterloo as a unity? It is important not to confuse ! 
this extreme nsrtition with the partition corresponding ' 
to the highest level at which an event may be viewed.
By way of comparison, let us first consider the event 
of Jones* waving goodbye. The highest level at which 
this can be viewed is 40 the highest level# of 
objects that we have so far considered - namely, conscious
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animals. It is, as a matter of fact, also this level 
which, in the case of this event, has associated with 
it the partition that does not intrude on the Contents 
of the event. The most natural description to go with 
the event - ’Jones* waving goodbye* - reflects no break­
down of the event into constituents. Similar remarks 
are not true of the Battle of Waterloo, and great care 
needs to be taken in the use of this description; It 
has been argued that the battle of "Waterloo has different 
necessary properties from the event that shares the same 
value at the real world, but which partitions the physical 
manifestation into men. The battle might have been fought 
by a completely different set of &en, but a series of men 
fighting could not be this series of men fighting if the 
former involved no men present in the letter. The battle 
of Waterloo is an event corresponding to the next higher , 
level of objects, constructed out of the level of conscious 
animals. This, more abstract level, of objects consists of 
things like nations, social groups, and so on. Thus it
I
may be said that the battle of Waterloo was fought by 
England and France, that it was decisive, and so? on, and 
these properties, at face value, make sense only for a 
level of objects higher than the level of individual men.
It might be thought there is a difficulty here. 
According to the account just given, this highest level 
of viewing the battle of Waterloo does not treat it as a
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simple unity, but as something reducible to p relation 
of conflict between two nations. Thus the French and 
English armies, such as they are contained within the 
boundaries of the event, are conceived as spatio-temporal 
slices of two nations. And there is a partition that 
splits the-event into these two sub-events. The point 
is well taken, but it would be wrong to think it is an 
objection to the theory presented here. To see the 
battle of Waterloo as a unity is not to see it as the 
battle of Waterloo; no significance is to be attached 
to the fact that this description does not imply any 
breakdown ôf the physical manifestation of the event.
The extreme partition whereby there is in fact no break­
down into sub-events is not always identical by any 
means with the highest level from which the event can be 
viewed. In the case of Jones* waving goodbye, this 
happens to be the case, but not because of this 
description; the description simply illustrates the 
event's nature as an individed ( impartitioned ) event 
of the level of conscious animals.
The properties that are true of the event 
unpartitioned are in fact the most basic properties, 
true of events of all levels; namely, properties of 
spatio-temporal location. It is worthwhile to stress, 
in conjunction with this point, that the paper is 
attempting to construct a theory of events, not a theory 
of event descriptions. Of course, our ultimate goal is
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the complete .explication of event-discourse hut the 
contribution this paper ie supposed to make to that
endeavour is the provision of an ontological theory about
events. How descriptions refer to events, and their
analysis in terms of concerts like rigid and non-rigid
designation and so on, are not problems this paper tries
to tackle; I use the expression 'Johes* raving goodbye'
and assume that it suggests there is no partition in the
physical manifestation; but at the seme time 'the battle
of Waterloo* is m description corresponding to a level in
which the manifestation is partitioned, although this is
not apparent from the expression 'the battle of Waterloo*.
From here, I wish to proceed to the problem of the 
analysis of the ascription of properties to events. It 
would seem possible to hold the belief that the properties 
of events ere reducible to just two categories - properties 
of spatio-temporal location,, and causal properties.
While I %ill not defend this position, for simplicity I 
will assume its trvith, and so offer an analysis of 
properties only for these two kinds. Further, I hope that 
the foregoing discussion has shown how such an analysis of 
property ascription might be generated. Firstly, let us 
consider the ascription of properties of location; if P 
in (FI) - (F3) is taken as such e property, I think it 1$ 
clear from the foregoing that these statement-forms may be
analysed as follows: with r as the real world,
(FI*) e(r) is P;
(F2*) e(r) is ?, but there are worlds w such that w ^  r end
e(w) is not-?;
(F3*) There is no world w such that e(w) is not-P.
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Tlth causal Properties, the situation is 
naturally more complex. In order to remain neutral as 
regards emergentism, and leave room for an emergentist 
metaphysics, it will he necessary to subscript properties 
according to the level of integration of matter which is 
the lowest in the hierarchy at which they can, at face 
value, be meaningfully applied. This is the level at 
which the property would be said to emerge. Incidentally, 
we may say an event is of a level which is the highest one 
of which there are properties true of it. Equally, v;e 
cannot, as we did with locational properties, take as the 
holder of the property the value of the event at the world 
in ouestion. This value Is shared by many different events 
of differing levels. Rather we are considering, when 
ascribing causal nronerties, the physical manifestation 
of the event partitioned in the particular way that is 
associated with the event. Let ^hg(w)^ be a singular 
term referring to such a partitioned physical manifestation 
in this case, that of event g in world w. If 1 is the 
level at which the property P 'emerges*, or 'supervenes*, 
the etatement-forms under consideration are analyséd as 
follows ;
(PI**) ^he(r)^ is
(P2**) ^he(r)^ is P^, but there are worlds w such that w 
/ r and ( he(w)^ is not-P^.
(P3**) There is no world w such that ^ he(w)^ is not-P^.
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The emergentist will deny the coherence of the claim 
” hg_(w) is ", if the partitioning giving rise to 
h^(w) is of a lower level than 1.
It is undeniable that the theory cannot get very 
far without more details being provided of the precise 
nature of the causal histories of the worlds. But it r\1-
should be mentioned that many of the problems about its 
structure are not the concern of the analysis of events, 
but depend on a decision about reductionism end 
emergentism, and this is highlighted by the position of 
the causal history in this account of events - as an 
undefined given, satisfying a minimal description. Some 
explanatory remarks of a metaphorical sort may, however, 
be of assistance in elucidating the# position of causal 
histories in this theory.
Consider a world of Physical objects, being 
balls of certain masses and velocities moving in a 
Newtonian space. The movement end interaction of the 
balls throughout a time period is one strand, one chain, 
in the causal history of the world viewed as a collect­
ion of balls. Another strand throughout that period is 
the movement and interaction of elementary particles 
comprising those balls. An event may be considered
f
that is a time-slice of the world; an event, furthermore, 
of the same level as the physical objects. We have called 
each partition in this event a stage in the causal history, 
and what this means should be a little clearer with
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reference to this example. The time slice of s ball, 
with properties of mass, location end movement, may 
be seen as having causes end effects within the entire 
history of the world, conceived at this level. It is 
3 meaningful whole in reference to the laws governing 
that causal history, in a way that some perverse 
Partitioning, uniting as a single sub-event, odd ball- 
slices from various parts of the world, is not.
^hat needs to be done, finally, is for the t 
theory just presented to be tested against the conditions 
of adequacy laid down at the beginning of the paper, and 
to consider how the theory copes with the particular 
concrete examples of purported event identity that have 
so far been considered.
?o begin, we may consider (Cl) to (04).
(Cl) is, clearly, satisfied; there is no spatio- 
temporal particular w^ich does not take place at some | 
oarticular time and place. (02) is satisfied, also.
''^ hile the precise nature of causal histories has not i
been dealt with to any great degree, it is strongly j
suggested that the causal relation holds between sub­
events, which are both of course spatio-temnoral entities.
(03) is also satisfied. To take an example, 
the battle of Waterloo and the movement of particles have 
been distinguished as events, that is, ">t the level of 
functions, but their spatio-temporal values - and, a 
fortiori, their physical manifestations - are identical
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et the real world. They have associated with them 
different partitioning processes, hut they operate on 
the same thing. Whether or not the causal chain in 
which the battle is a stage is reducible to that in 
which the movement of particles is a stage is a question 
independent of the identity of physical manifestations.
It needs to be said though that the adoption of 
(C3) as a condition of adequacy does considerably reduce 
the scope for any emergentism, as in some strong forms 
it may well be argued that in no way are the battle of 
Waterloo and the movement of particles, even at the 
spatio-temporal level, identical. The correspondingly 
weaker form of (C3) that is associated with this sort of 
idea is the position that no distinct things of the same 
sort can have identical locations in space-time. Little 
can be said ^ eiat the prospects for such a theory, though 
it certainly cannot be ruled out that a coherent account 
of the relation between the battle and the movement of 
particles may emerge from it. So much seems to hang on 
the explicit formulation of the condition itself, for the 
definition of what different sorts of things are, and 
the criteria given for determining which sort of thing 
some particular belongs to may well contain the essence
f
of the emergentism in the whole account.
(C4) is satisfied also, following naturally from 
the satisfaction of (02) and (03).
(P4) has not yet been considered directly, but
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the theory cleerly gives rise to the following interpretat­
ion !
(pi*.) Per all w, f(w) = e(w).
We may now turn to the particular cases of purported event 
identity that have been discussed. Firstly, there is the 
case of Frutus’ stabbing Caesar and his killing him.
Clearly, at the level of functions, there are tv;o events 
to be distinguished here; even if their values coincide 
at the real world, there are clearly worlds where they 
diverge. Brutus* stabbing Caesar might have been a 
wounding, and not a killing, and his killing him might 
have been ? clubbing, and not a stabbing. It is to be 
noticed that I am assuming certain conventions hold about 
the relation between the event and the expression referr­
ing to it. In particular, I am assuming in cases like
.i
this that for an event to be, for example, Brutus* stabb­
ing of Caesar, it is necessary and sufficient that it be ! 
a stabbing of Caesar by Brutus, side-stepping any problems 
about uniqueness. The conditions for identity, then, c m  
be read off from the descriptions. j
For simplicity the historical killing of Caesar 
will not be considered, and rrither we will assume the 
fictitious one in which Brutus was the sole stabber is
(
the event we are concerned with. It the level pf physical
manifestations, the killing and the stabbing have associated
with them partitions of the same level. They are
distinguishable in space-time exactly as they were in the
I
previous discussion. The value of the killing of Caesar
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contains Caesar’s body completely, wheras Brutus* 
stabbing him does not. The two do not share an 
identical manifestation, then, in the real world, 
and have different, though very close, positions in a 
single thread in the world's causal history.
Two questions of possibility arise here; could 
the stabbing and killing have coincided, and does the 
act of killing ever coincide with the killing itself?
I am inclined to think that it might sometimes be the 
case the act of killing and the killing coincide- witness 
the death of someone from the explosion of a email bomb 
planted in his pocket; the act of killing this person 
most likely involves all his body, which is an important 
consideration, as we have seen. I am much more dohbtful 
that a stabbing is ever a killing. It would certainly 
have to be no ordinary staboing, and even in extreme 
cases I doubt it would be claimed the entire body was 
contained within the boundaries of the stabbing.
Similar remarks apply to the example concerning 
the relation between Socrates* death and Xantippe’s 
becoming a widow. Once again, at the level of functions, 
we have here two distinct events. Divergence is obvious 
in cases where they are not married. In the real world 
case, in which they are married, the remarks made earlier 
apply, mutatis mutandis, here also. In this case, the 
values of these two events do not even overlap. Cnee 
again, it should be mentioned that some of the force of  ^
this position derives from the way in which I am taking 
expressions to refer to events. Thus it is certainly
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possible to object that it is wrong to assume we can 
read off the necessary and sufficient identity conditions 
from 'Xantippe's becoming a widow’• ?^ ow it may be the 
case that the population is won over to a Davidsonian 
position and regularly use this expression to refer to 
Socrates’ death, but this is of no concern here. The 
expression is being used precisely to refer to that event 
whose identity conditions can be read off from the 
description.
The most interesting case not concerning 
modalities for this theory is, unsurprisingly, that in 
which the identity claim is upheld, namely the case of 
the ball being both heated and rotated during a given 
minute m. It would seem to be the case that we can yet 
again distinguish two events at the level of functions. 
Presumably, this ball could be heated at m without being 
rotated, and vies versa. will need to recognize,
though, the coincidence of the value of these functions 
at the real world, and while nothing has been «aid to j
rule it out, it might perhaps seem strange that they j
[
both partition the manifestation in the same way, but |
nevertheless are different events. |
I do not think this problem can be solved without 
some decisions about the necessary properties of the ball, 
for consider the following argument; assume that it is 1 
necessary that the ball be composed of the molecules that 
actually do compose it, or very nearly so anyway - we may
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allow something short of exact correspondance here.
Mow, clearly it is rash to say anything very definite 
about the necessary properties of events like a certain ' 
motion of molecules, but it seems at least a defensible 
hynothesis that for any motion of molecules to be 
identical to the one that shares the same value at 
the real world as the heating and rotation it too has to 
share the same value with a heating and a manifestation.
In reductionist terms, any motion of molecules that was 
not both a heating and a rotation could not be this motion. 
If this is correct, I think it may be inferred that the 
heating, the rotation, and the motion of these molecules 
all share the same value in every world and are, in 
consequence, all identical. This is an instance of 
a particularly strong reductionism, and in this case, I 
am inclined to believe it, or something like,it, is true. 
The weaker conclusion that arises if we drop the assumpt­
ion that the ball is necessarily composed of the particular 
molecules it is actually composed of - namely, that in any 
world where it composed of these molecules there is this 
heating at m if and only if there is this rotation - thip 
conclusion, I think, is quite acceptable. It is to be j 
noted that this heating was spoken of advisedly; in other 
words it might not have been to exactly the same temperai- 
ture, as indeed the rotation might not have been of exactly 
35 degrees. But to be identical with this heating, we \ 
cannot allow a variation from the actual final temperature 
of, say, thousands of degrees, any more than this rotation
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may be considered identical with the ball rotating 
through 360 degrees a hundred times during m.
Mo large sc^le adoption of reductionism is 
involved in this case; certainly the position is 
compatible with there being some emergent properties 
at the level of mediura-sizeS physical objects. But 
so long as a sharp distinction is drawn between heat • 
and the eensaticn of heat, examples like the one consider­
ed heem very strong examples for a reductionist position. 
The difficulties of the position of the heating and the 
rotation in the world’s causal history may be dissolved 
as before, and the emergentist is open to the line, 
if he wants to accept reductionism in this case, that 
at this point two causal chains in the world’s causal 
history are running parallel. —
Finally we need to consider the modal statements 
that were adopted with reference to a particular expMsion, 
at the beginning of ITT. There are four statements, each
of which is to be said to be true.
Initially, it is worthwhile to recall the
significance of these examples. They were raised in
opposition to the idea that the identity criteria \
!
proposed by Davidson, and that in (C3), may be interpreted 
in a particular modal way; in particular, I wish to deny 
that the causes and effects of an event are the necessary 
properties of that evert, anymore than its precise locat­
ion in space-time is.
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Nothing very positive has been said about what 
means might be used for determining which properties are 
necessary and which contingent, but in the discussion 
about the different sorts of properties that might be 
necessary for the battle of Waterloo compared with a 
movement of particles, there is the implicit idea that 
what an event's necessary properties are will depend on 
what sort of event it is. Thus, I think a decision may 
be reached about the necessary properties of the battle 
of "aterloo, and that explosion, only when we have some 
idea about the sort of properties that are necessary for 
battles and explosions in general. Of course, there 
might be further necessary properties peculiar to each 
particular case, but the frame of reference is a frame­
work of kinds.
The general theory of events, it follows^ should 
not have anything particular to say about necessary
1
properties, and as will be seen, the four sentences to 
be considered are easily incorporated into the picture 
that has been presented.
Firstly, " The expldsion might not have caused 
Smith to jump " is clearly true on the above account. • 
This explosion might well have taken place in a world 
in which Smith was nowhere near the explosion when it 
occurred, and so the explosions place in the causal 
history of that world would diverge from its place in 
the real world. - Similar remarks are applicable to the
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causes of the event too, which is the gist of the 
second statement: " The explosion might have been a
suicide, or Jones might have made a mistake ". Taking 
explosions to have necessary properties to do with size 
and location, basically, clearly the precise details 
of events and actions lending uo to the fatal mixing' 
of the explosive substances are not directly significant 
for the problem of the identification of the explosion.
Again, the statement " The explosion could have 
happened a few moments earlier " is easily accommodated 
in the approach urged here, and so is " Tlie explosion 
could have damaged the refectory " provided to do so it 
would not have had to be of a significantly different 
order.
In general, then we may say for each kind of 
event there will be a set of conditions, which each 
event in the kind will hold in a form modified to suit 
the particular requirements of the individual event.
These conditions determine which physical manifestations 
in various worlds may be considered to be manifestations 
of the event. It is the presence of conditions of this 
sort that helps most to characterize the event subset of 
Gr.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Despite the limitations of the analysis of 
events presented here, I would claim that it has 
succeded in the aims established at the beginning of this 
paper. It satisfies conditions (Cl) - (C4), while having
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the scope needed according to conditions (PI) - (P4). 
Further, all the particular instances of assertions of 
event-identity are given the appropriate truth-value 
by the theory; it also does not attempt to provide 
any a priori account of the necessary properties of 
events in general, which is. here considered undesirable 
as is apparent from the remarks immediately above. 
Finally, it leaves room for the rejection or develop- : 
ment of an emergentist metanhysics, and I would claim, 
sheds some light on just what is at stake in the 
emergentiat dispute with reductionism. The analysis 
has, then, I hope, some value as a first step towards 
a theor^ r of events.^
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would seem, in fact, that a partial function
would be more defensible from the point of 
view of our intuitions. I do not want to 
discuss this though; the reason for a total 
function being employed is simply the fact 
that if the presentation of this theory in a 
formal language was attempted, the construct­
ion of the truth-definition will proceed all 
the more easily if a total function is 
employed.
35. Once again, I have ih mind here s total, , 
rather than a partial function, following 
Cresswell. As before, there are probably 
good intuitive reasons, from the point of 
view of metaphysics, for making the decision 
in favour of the partial function, but in 
terms of the development of-the theory form­
ally, the total-function version would be 
most naturally considered first.
36. The relation holding between the partitioned 
objects, dr more generally, sub-events, is 
that derived from the geometry on ^  .
-F9-
37. Me are leaving non-enimal life out of 
account here, for simplicity.
38. Clearly it is the case that locational 
properties are sometimes causal ones.
Any locational property true of e(w) is 
clearly true of any ^he(w)^ .
39. For further discussion, see=wiggins, 
especially fn.44, p.72.
40. I would like to thank Dr. W.Hart for his j v 
help in the production of this paper.
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